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Taliban and democracy: The unequal equation
DR. SIEGFRIED O.
WOLF
n June 18th the Taliban
opened a liaison office in
Doha, the capital city of the
state of Qatar, a close ally of the US
in thePersianGulf region.Thisdoes
not come as a surprise since nego-
tiations about the opening of such
a facility startedalreadya fewyears
ago. Taken into account the unfor-
tunate trajectory of US/NATO’s
engagement in Afghanistan, the
Obamaadministrationhas realised
that a military solution to the con-
flict is not possible and a satisfying
political solutionregarding thegoals
that were set by his predecessor,
GeorgeW.Bush, toestablishadem-
ocratic, stabilised, and socio-eco-
nomicprosperingAfghanistanhave
become increasingly unrealistic.
Subsequently, in 2009 Obama sig-
nificantlynarrowed thescopeof the
mission“todisrupt, dismantle, and
defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and to prevent their
return to either country in the
future”. In consequence, when/if
theTalibanarewilling tocutoff their
links with al-Qaeda, they are not
any more identified as a primary
target or combatant. The fact that
Bush’s “war against terrorism” got
condensed into a struggle against
al-Qaeda is today used as a moral
justification for starting talks with
the Taliban.
However, considering the
tremendoushuman losses and the
extra-ordinary financial burden
which ensued its involvement in
Afghanistan, it is understandable
to a certain degree that the US is
trying to organise a more or less
smooth troop withdrawal from
Afghanistan.Of course, the first and
most essential step in thisdirection
is to get in touch with one’s foe to
spot a way to get out of the Afghan
imbroglio.
Obviously, the matter of an exit
strategy which ensures a safe and
rapidwithdrawal is identifiedas the
top priority by the US at the
moment. In order to achieve this,
it seems that the Obama adminis-
tration does not mind to distance
itself from Bush’s prior aims and is
willing to accept the participation
of theTaliban in the governmentof
Afghanistan. In sum one could
argue that the purchase of security
will be most likely on the expense
of liberty and human rights!
Based on the naive illusion that
one can negotiate and implement
anagreement inasustainableman-
ner with ideologically indoctrinat-
ed fundamentalists, the US starts
talks with the Taliban over power-
sharing inAfghanistan inexchange
for less trouble. Here one of the
most disturbing features of the
whole issue is found; the sudden
appearance of the notion that the
Talibanarewilling toparticipate as
a trustworthy stakeholder in the
political-administrative system of
Afghanistan and the –deliberately
or unintended- total ignorance of
former experiences of Taliban’s
incredibility andadamant ideolog-
icalmind-set and standpoints. It is
interesting to note here, that at the
beginning of NATO’s Afghanistan
campaign it was a taboo to men-
tion any idea of direct negotiation
with the Taliban in order to work
out a political solution.
Several politicians mentioning
this idea got under severe political
pressure, like Kurt Beck in April
2007, a then leading oppositional
German politician from the Social
DemocraticParty (SPD). Incontrast,
today it seems that any substantial
questioningof talkswith theTaliban
is considered as a sacrilege risking
the minimum change of a political
solution for the still on-going war.
This is gainingmomentumsince
the new attitude enforces a trend
of ignoring the actual major cause
for 12 years of fighting, thousands
ofdeathsandbillionsofdollars:The
fact that the Taliban movement is
ananti-systemic, terrorist forcewith
adeeplynon-negotiable anti-dem-
ocratic habitus. Both the Pakistani
Taliban and theAfghanTaliban are
not in favour of any form of demo-
cratic government.They condemn
all kindsof liberal valuesandnorms,
respect for human rights as well as
democratic institutions like politi-
cal parties and elections as anti-
Islamicandalienconcepts. Inbrief,
all Taliban factions -independent
fromdifferentorganisational struc-
ture, strategies, tactics or interests-
are fundamentally autocratic in
nature.
Therefore, using theargumentof
thenecessity to integrate theTaliban
into the political structure of
Afghanistan and the subsequent
need to give thema share of power
in order to achieve peace and sta-
bility is not only dangerous, reck-
lessandadistortionof factsbutalso
hypocritical. There are no serious
indications that the Taliban will
change their interests and tactics,
especially their major goal of re-
establishing the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, an extra-ordinary
repressive autocratic regime con-
trolling the country between1996-
2001until it gotoustedby the inter-
national community.
The fact, that theTalibanused the
flag and the name of their former
regime during the inauguration of
their new office in Doha is just
another confirmation of this.
Amajor cruxof the talksbetween
the US and the Taliban is that as
soon as they go beyond talking
about a ceasefire and other issues
related with the armed conflict it
will be characterised by a tremen-
dous lack of legitimacy and demo-
craticdeficit.This is becauseof two
reasons: First, any agreement
betweenUSandTalibanwhichwill
affect the power structure and the
institutional-administrative system
is illegitimate since it is anoutcome
ofadecision-makingprocesswhich
isnot recognizedby theAfghancon-
stitution. Second, the only legiti-
mate actor, theAfghanexecutive in
combination with and legislative
which is representing the people’s
sovereignty (if one ignores theman-
ifoldmanipulationsof the lastpres-
idential elections in 2009) is either
not included or not taken serious-
ly by the other negotiations part-
ner. Consequently, any substantial
agreement,which leads toa reshap-
ingof the existingpower-structure,
is not legitimateuntil it is approved
by the respective Afghan institu-
tions.
Having this in mind, it is espe-
cially noteworthy, that in case of a
political rehabilitationandamnesty
theTalibanwill havemost likelyno
chance at the moment to get into
power through free and fair elec-
tions. First of all, even if thenumer-
ous factions of theTaliban arewill-
ing to agreeononeorganof formal
political representation (political
party) and if they are able to gain
the support of the Pashtun popu-
lation (which amounts to 42% of
the Afghan population), they will
never be able to make an inroad
into theTajik (27%), Uzbek (9%) or
Hazara (9%) communities in order
to achieve a majority of votes.
Furthermore, thedemographic sta-
tistic is turning even more against
the Taliban in the context of elec-
tion when one recalls their strict
rejection of women participation
in public sphere as well as in poli-
tics.
Also their repressive actions
against the rudimentary but grow-
ingcivil societyorganisationswhich
use internet-based social networks
will backfire. One should also keep
in mind, that not all Pashtuns are
in favour of the Taliban and that a
homogenous pro-Taliban Pashtun
backing remains a myth.
Considering the mechanisms of
Afghanistanelectoral systemdonot
encourage the formation of coali-
tion governments he option for
forming political alliances are lim-
ited.
However, being aware of the fact
that elections are most likely no
option for them to achieve power
theywill enforceaprocess tounder-
mine the notion of election as the
only way of political elite recruit-
ment and government formation.
By realising this, the Taliban will
most likely agree on certain
demands–at leastonpaper–togain
political capital out of the with-
drawal of the foreign troops, in the
form of legitimization and by the
US-backed institutionalized role for
them.
When such an extra-constitu-
tional agreementof power-sharing
will be enforced, the Taliban will
obtain legitimacy and an official,
formal bridgehead in the political-
administrative system.
Despite the fact that theup-com-
ing Doha talks are lacking legiti-
macy, the US will make sure that
the talkswill prepare theground for
a US-Taliban arrangement dealing
with the conditions and potential
concessions.There are already sev-
eral occasions, showing that theUS
–including theObamaadministra-
tion- do not care about democrat-
ic norms, values and procedures
when it contradicts their ownsecu-
rity and geopolitical interests in
Afghanistan. Someof theexamples
include the ‘enthronement’ of
Karzai in the aftermath of the first
Bonn conference in 2001 and the
ignoranceof themanipulatedpres-
idential electionsunder the eyes of
the international community, and
the total ignorance of it during the
second Bonn conference in 2011.
However, it ishighlyprobably that
any allocated segments for the
Taliban in the country’s political
decision-makingprocesswill serve
as a starting point for a gradual
extensionof their institutional lever-
ageduring thenext tenureafter the
presidential election in spring2014.
Thecountry’s judicial system, edu-
cation sector and the constitution
aswell as respectiveministries and
commissions will be some of the
first,primary targets. Inotherwords,
what will happen is a ‘re-
Talibanisation’ of the state and
therefore also the society.
Without any doubts this means
theendofall improvements regard-
ing the democratic transition and
the situationofwomenandgirls. In
this context, one must also state
that theTalibanwill not feelbound-
ed by the any constitution or legal
framework ensuring general fun-
damental and human rights. The
way in which theTaliban were try-
ing to sabotagePakistan’s 2013gen-
eral elections, in order to archive
their goal of a Sharia-based auto-
cratic regime, clearly shows that the
democraticpathofassumingpower
through free and fair elections and
especially the respectof freedomof
speechandopinion isnotanoption
for them.
It also casts some dark shadows
on the upcoming elections in
Afghanistan. Because the only
choice in their ideologicallynarrow
and truncated thinking is between
two options: surrender to the
Talibanpolitical and social-cultur-
al supremacy go prepare for war
which means struggling with all
kind of physical and physiological
violence.
Endemic violence caused by the
Taliban, blackmailing and threat-
eningof rivalpoliticalpartiesaswell
as their candidates andsupporters,
potential voters will doubtless
remain as a significant feature in
Afghanistan landscape even after
one for the US satisfying outcome
of theDoha talks isachieved,mean-
ing primarily a smooth withdraw-
alof thebulkof their combat troops.
Therefore, the talks with the
Taliban are not about achieving a
sustainable peace, stable process
ofdemocratic consolidation,or res-
cuing the rare achievements of
more than one decade of engage-
mentby the international commu-
nity. Instead, they are more about
trying tobring a smooth end to the
US’s military adventure in
Afghanistan and to shirk
Washington’s responsibilities
towards the Afghan people. One
can’t help but feeling that history
repeats itself.The current situation
seems a déjà vu of Nixon’s
„Vietnamisation“ doctrine in the
late 1960s when the US was seek-
ing a way out ofVietnam without a
loss of face. To sum up, there was
war before NATO and there will be
warafterNATO.Unfortunately, this
mantrawill benotvalid for the state
of democracy in Afghanistan!
The writer is a lecturer of Political
Science and International Relations
as well as a senior research fellow in
the Department of Political Science,
South Asia Institute, Heidelberg
University
Financing the next development agenda
MAHMOUD MOHIELDIN
s the2015 targetdate for the
Millennium Development
Goals approaches, the
United Nations is intensifying its
efforts to fosterdebateaboutwhat
comes next for promotion of
developmentworldwide.Theout-
come of these discussions will
shape policies and investment
aimed at spurring GDP growth,
strengtheninghumancapital, and
promoting more inclusive pros-
perity.
With the global population
expectedtoreachninebillionpeo-
ple by 2050 – a significant pro-
portion of whom will reside in
developing or underdeveloped
countries– the international com-
munity must improve access to
education, health care, and
employmentopportunitiesworld-
wide.Meanwhile, theprospect of
a rise in global temperature of
more than 2°C (3.6°F) over pre-
industrial levels by the endof this
century (which would trigger
globalwarming’smost damaging
effects) calls forhigher investment
in sustainable urbanization, cli-
mate-smartagriculture, andsocial
safetynets.Both factors challenge
us to define, in the longer term,
more sustainablepatternsofpro-
duction and consumption.
Governments, civil society, and
theprivate sectormust rise to the
challenge, cooperating to findand
implementcreativesolutions.But,
first, they must anticipate the
associated financing require-
ments, which will soon surpass
the current capacities of govern-
ments and international donors,
and take action now to activate
new, reliable sourcesof financing.
To start, governments should
design targeted, evidence-based
policies and support the devel-
opmentof sound institutions.This
would make government servic-
es more effective, while helping
to catalyze additional develop-
ment aid from traditional donors
and mobilize private-sector
resources.
Inmanycountries, there is con-
siderable scope for domestic
resource mobilization.
Broadening the taxbase, improv-
ing tax administration, and clos-
ing gaps in the value-added tax
could make a significant differ-
ence in lower-income countries,
where tax revenues account for
only about 10-14% of GDP, com-
pared to 20-30% of GDP in high-
income countries.
More equitable taxation would
have a positive impact on gover-
nance, another important tool for
mobilizing domestic resources.
With improved corporate and
publicgovernanceandclear trans-
fer-pricingpolicies, resource-rich
countries could shore up their
capacity tonegotiate fair contracts
withextractive industries, balance
revenues and expenditures over
time, and manage their natural
endowments more transparent-
ly.
Progress in these areas would
helpgovernments tochannel their
spendingmoreeffectively toward
thosewhowouldbenefit themost.
For example, only 8% of the $409
billion spent on fossil-fuel subsi-
dies in 2010 reached the poorest
20% of the population. A target-
ed support program could
increase substantially the effi-
ciency of spending, freeing up
resources for education, health,
and poverty eradication.
Furthermore,promoting finan-
cial deepeningand inclusiveness
could accelerate private-sector
growth, creating more opportu-
nities. Indeed, broader access to
financial services would help the
estimated 400 million micro,
small, and medium-size enter-
prises in developing countries to
prosper,whileenabling the2.5bil-
lion people worldwide who cur-
rently lack access to such servic-
es to build their assets.
A deeper and more efficient
financial sectorwouldalso reduce
transactioncostsand facilitate risk
management. Local-currency
bondmarketscouldhelp todevel-
op domestic investor bases and
mobilizedomestic savings to sup-
port long-term investments.
At the same time, the interna-
tional community shouldwork to
improve theavailabilityandeffec-
tiveness of official development
assistance.TheODAtargetof0.7%
of GDP – agreed in 2002 at the
International Conference on
Financing for Development in
Monterrey,Mexico– shouldmoti-
vate countries to increase their
contributions.They canalso take
steps to make ODA more pre-
dictable from year to year.
Donors should structure aid to
ensure that it supports sound
national development policies
and programs, rather than their
ownnarrow interests.This is par-
ticularly relevant as emerging
development partners, especial-
ly theBRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa), offer
new kinds of aid packages that
incorporate investmentandnon-
financial assistance.
Private charities, which have
been instrumental in promoting
innovation in fields suchashealth
care, the environment, and edu-
cation, could provide valuable
insight into channeling aid more
effectively.
Moregenerally, improvingcoor-
dination among donors would
help to maximize the impact of
aid on the ground.
While ODA remains an impor-
tant source of financing for frag-
ile and very-low-income coun-
tries, it represents only 7% of net
financial flows to developing
countries, where foreign direct
investment, remittances, long-
term debt, and portfolio invest-
menthavea larger impact.Donors
should leverage aid to “grow the
pie” and to diversify financing
sources for the world’s poorest
countries by providing risk guar-
antees, innovative investment
vehicles, debt syndication, and
co-financing arrangements.
Attracting even a fraction of the
assets held by institutional
investors, sovereign-wealth funds,
and public pension funds could
boost development finance sub-
stantially.
Diaspora populations are
anothermajorpotential sourceof
development financing.Reducing
transfer costs, which average an
estimated9%of thevalueof trans-
actions, would put more money
into thehandsof thosewhoneed
it most. Tailoring financial prod-
ucts for diaspora communities
couldattract resources for invest-
ment,while reinforcingmigrants’
ties – economic and otherwise –
to their home countries.
Finally, the international com-
munity bears a special responsi-
bility for delivering global public
goods. The responsibility to pre-
serve the environment, stem the
spreadofcommunicablediseases,
strengthen the international
financial architecture, enhance
developing-countryparticipation
in the global trading system, and
facilitate the exchange of knowl-
edge lies at the intersection of
national development priorities
and global interests.
Duty-free, quota-free access to
OECD markets, complemented
bysimpler,more transparent rules
of origin, would raise GDP by 1%
in the least-developed countries,
lifting millions out of poverty.
Investment in statistical capacity
would help governments and
businesses worldwide to make
better policy decisions, based on
amoreaccurateaccountingof the
associated costs and benefits.
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lenge of the post-2015 develop-
ment agenda lies in finding cre-
ative solutions to support pros-
perity, equality, and sustainabili-
ty. Together, governments, civil
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improve theavailability andqual-
ity of finance for development,
and shape a better future for all.
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